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Abstract 
 The theoretical and empirical links between public health insurance access and fertility in the 
United States remain unclear. Utilizing a demographic cell-based estimation approach with panel data 
(1987-1997), we revisit the large-scale Medicaid expansions to pregnant women during the 1980s to 
estimate the heterogeneous impacts of public health insurance access on childbirth. While the decision 
to become a parent (i.e., the extensive margin) appears to be unaffected by increased access to Medicaid, 
we find that increased access to public health insurance positively influenced the number of high parity 
births (i.e., the intensive margin) for select groups of women. In particular, we find a robust, positive birth 
effect for unmarried women with a high school education, a result which is consistent across the two racial 
groups examined in our analysis: African American and white women. This result suggests that 
investigating effects along both the intensive and extensive margin is important for scholars who study 
the natalist effects of social welfare policies, and our evidence provides a more nuanced understanding 
of the influence of public health insurance on fertility.  
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I. Introduction 
 Created in 1965, the Medicaid program provides public health insurance for many low-income 
groups, including pregnant women, infants, and children. Since its inception, the program has grown 
tremendously, both in terms of expenditures and coverage. For instance, in 2010, 44 percent of all births 
in the United States were principally financed by the program, up from 15 percent in 1985 (Singh, Gold, 
and Frost 1994; Markus et al. 2013). The Affordable Care Act (ACA) has extended coverage to even 
more low-income mothers and children (Kaiser Family Foundation 2014). While ostensibly a program 
designed to cover health care expenditures, critics have long speculated that the benefits provided 
through government social welfare programs – such as cash welfare (AFDC/TANF) and Medicaid – 
induce low-income women to bear children by reducing the financial costs of giving birth. Theoretically, 
any large reduction in the cost of childbearing could increase fertility (Becker 1960, 1991). Given that 
the average cost of childbirth in the United States was $4,334 in 1989 (Health Insurance Association of 
America, 1989) – which is roughly $8,500 in 2016 dollars – public health insurance expansions to 
pregnant women should greatly reduce the costs of childbirth for the previously uninsured, potentially 
affecting fertility.  
 There is a large empirical literature investigating the link between social welfare programs and 
childbearing at the population level, most of which suggests that social policies do not have large fertility 
effects, if any at all (Lopoo and Raissian 2012, 2014; Moffitt 2003). However, it is possible that previous 
attempts to isolate these fertility effects were hampered by heterogeneity in the response by birth parity. 
As we show below, the decision to become a parent, i.e., the “extensive margin,” may be affected by social 
policy very differently from its influence on a 2nd, 3rd, or 4th child, i.e., the “intensive margin.” Utilizing 
the natural experiment created by the federally mandated Medicaid expansions to pregnant women 
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occurring in the late 1980s and early 1990s, our goal in this paper is to investigate the heterogeneous 
impacts of increased public health insurance access on births at different parities.  
 More specifically, we use the demographic cell-based estimation approach employed by 
Zavodny and Bitler (2010) and DeLeire, Lopoo, and Simon (2011) as a conceptual starting point for our 
empirical modeling in this paper. We further incorporate the work of Hamersma and Kim (2013) who 
argue that use of Medicaid state income eligibility thresholds directly reduces mismeasurement and, thus, 
bias, which could be caused by imputing eligibility. Through this combination of a more refined measure 
of access to public health care for pregnant women and an analysis of birth trends by parity, we attempt 
to better understand the behavioral impacts of a large-scale expansion of health insurance eligibility.  
 In our empirical modeling, we do not find consistent effects of the Medicaid expansions on the 
decision to enter motherhood – i.e., on the extensive margin. However, we see statistically significant and 
robust increases in higher order births for unmarried, African American and white women with a high 
school education.  We note similar results for other unmarried women categories, but these results are 
not as robust across specifications.  
II. Relevant Literature 
 Policy scholars have completed a large body of research attempting to estimate the relationship 
between social welfare programs and fertility. The largest set of work investigates the relationship 
between the AFDC/TANF program and fertility (see e.g., Duncan and Hoffman 1990, Hao and Cherlin 
2004, Hoynes 1997, Kaestner et al. 2003, Kearney 2004, and Lopoo and DeLeire 2006). However, 
researchers have also studied links between fertility and Child Support Enforcement (see e.g., Garfinkel 
et al. 2003 and Plotnick et al. 2004) and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (Almond, 
Hoynes, and Schanzenbach 2011). Lopoo and Raissian (2012, 2014) summarize this literature and find 
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mixed evidence of a fertility effect resulting from social welfare policies. In some instances, authors 
estimate a pronatalist effect, but it is often statistically insignificant and, when significant, small.  
 More relevant for this study, research from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) was 
the first to document a relationship between health insurance coverage and fertility. In this experimental 
setting, women who were offered free health insurance were 29 percent more likely to have a child during 
the experimental period than women in the control group who had a cost-sharing plan (Leibowitz 
1990).1 Consistent with much of this literature, Leibowitz writes that the observed differences are most 
likely a change in the timing of childbearing, or what demographers call a “tempo effect.” It is difficult to 
determine from this investigation if women in the treatment group had more children than they would in 
the counterfactual state or if they simply changed the point in their life-course when they had children. 
 To date, there have been three articles asking if Medicaid expansions are related to fertility. 
Joyce, Kaestner, and Kwan (1998) use data from 15 states between 1986 and 1992 for 19- to 27-year-
olds with a high school education or less to estimate the relationship between Medicaid expansions and 
state fertility rates. The expansions were measured with two indicator variables: the first was coded one 
if the state increased the eligibility threshold to the federal poverty line following the 1986 Omnibus 
Reconciliation Act (OBRA), and a second if the state expanded eligibility to income-to-needs ratios 
between 1.0 and 1.85 of the federal poverty line following the 1987 and 1989 OBRAs. They find that 
the first expansion is associated with a 5 percent increase in births among white women and no change 
among African American women.  
                                                                        
1 The RAND HIE had three different cost-sharing plans, but because the policies had a maximum out-of-pocket expenditure, 
most members of the control group paid approximately $1,000 for their insurance coverage. 
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 Zavodny and Bitler (2010) and DeLeire, Lopoo, and Simon (2011) use data from all 50 states 
and the District of Columbia. In addition, they construct the fraction of a national population eligible for 
Medicaid in each state based on the policies in place each year, a technique first used by Currie and 
Gruber (1996). In the case of Zavodny and Bitler, similar to the current study, they also use the expansion 
related income thresholds for Medicaid eligibility expressed as a fraction of the poverty line. Neither 
Zavodny and Bitler (2010) nor DeLeire et al. (2011) find a statistically significant relationship between 
the simulated eligibility measure and fertility. Zavodny and Bitler do show a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between the Medicaid threshold and fertility among white women with less than 
12 years of education.  
 Importantly, the outcome used in all of these earlier studies on Medicaid and fertility is either an 
aggregate birthrate or the number of births.2 As we explained earlier, these measures treat births the 
same regardless of parity, conflating changes in fertility on the extensive and intensive margins.3 Given 
the potential differences by parity, our research separately models first, second, third, and fourth (or 
more) births. Moreover, a second limitation of the previous literature is in the potential for 
mismeasurement of eligibility when simulating the generosity of the state-level Medicaid program, as in 
DeLeire et al (2011). By using the state Medicaid thresholds directly, which are a function of the federal 
poverty line and do not vary by family size or marital status of the parents, we utilize a more refined 
measure which increases the accuracy of our estimates. And, finally, by using an algorithm to assign values 
to mothers with missing educational attainment data in the birth certificate data, we are able to estimate 
                                                                        
2 Both outcome variables are estimated using the natural log of the birth measure. 
3 DeLeire et al. (2011) do have one online table that investigates first births along as a robustness check. They do not, 
however, run models with higher parity births separately. 
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our demographic cell based approach using all births recorded in the United States.4 All of these efforts 
provide the strongest evidence to date that Medicaid expansions to pregnant women significantly 
impacted higher-order fertility for women with low skill levels. 
III. Theoretical Background 
 Theoretically, the Medicaid expansions we investigate are likely to produce pronatalist 
responses. To begin, the cost of prenatal care, delivery, and well-child visits are covered by this public 
insurance program, which reduces the cost of giving birth substantially. Following the neoclassical 
microeconomic model, these cost reductions should lead to an increase in the demand for children 
(Becker 1960, 1991) which would drive up the number of intentional pregnancies. Moreover, women 
who become pregnant unintentionally may also become more likely to give birth rather than have an 
abortion due to the reduced childbirth costs incurred by insured adults (Zavodny and Bitler 2010). At 
the same time, it is plausible, particularly if the expansions improved child health, that parents would opt 
to have fewer children based on the quality-quantity trade-off parents face (Becker and Lewis 1973) 
because access to care would require fewer pregnancies to obtain the same number of healthy (or “high 
quality”) adult children.  
 As mentioned earlier, most reviews that cover the relationship between policy and fertility find 
very little evidence of a connection, and this is especially true for the small literature studying the 
relationship between Medicaid and fertility. However, recent evidence from Aaronson, Lange, and 
Mazumder (2014), who investigated the link between school costs and family size among African 
American families, demonstrates that cost changes can affect the extensive and intensive margins 
                                                                        
4 In the early period, education data was not collected in California, New York, Texas, and Washington. Zavodny and Bitler 
(2010) exclude these observations when examining models by mother’s education; however, using the methodology outlined 
in the Appendix, we recover these observations. 
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differently, and this may explain some of the null findings in the literature. The decision to become a 
parent, i.e., have one’s first child, is a major life decision. The gain many potential parents expect from 
entering parenthood may be so large that small cost savings from the Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families program or Medicaid, for example, do not affect their fertility decision on the extensive margin 
appreciably. If, however, there are diminishing marginal returns to parenthood for each birth, these same 
cost savings, may alter one’s decision to become a parent for, say, the third or fourth time. Thus, one might 
expect to observe differences on the intensive and extensive margins caused by policy change.  
IV. Legislative Background 
 A shared link between this paper and its predecessors in the literature is the natural experiment 
exploited to derive potentially causal impacts of expanded access to public health insurance. The federal 
government began mandating major expansions in coverage for pregnant women and children for the 
state-run Medicaid programs beginning in the mid-1980s.5 Before this series of legislative acts, Medicaid 
was typically tied to the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, the cash welfare 
system targeting low-income single mothers. Under this specific initial targeting, other low-income 
populations, such as single women pregnant for the first time or married women, were often categorically 
ineligible, even though many of them would have met the AFDC income thresholds established at the 
state level.  
 Seeking, in part, to address the comparatively high infant mortality rate in the United States 
(Currie and Gruber 1996), Congress began enacting legislation that gradually expanded Medicaid 
                                                                        
5 As noted earlier, the Medicaid program in the United States dates back to 1965. It is designed as a state and federal 
partnership, whereby states receive significant federal funds to offset healthcare costs borne at the local level. In exchange for 
these federal funds, states were mandated to provide select services and cover select populations and, in the initial years, the 
administration of the state-level public health insurance program (Medicaid) was typically linked to the state-level cash 
assistance program (AFDC). Both the population and services have change greatly over time – the increase in generosity for 
the former is the natural experiment we examine in this analysis. 
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access to many low-income populations. Starting annually in 1984, there were six major legislative 
actions mandating coverage expansions to pregnant women and their children.6 With these acts, 
Congress substantially decoupled the Medicaid and AFDC programs and greatly increased the number 
of individuals eligible for public health insurance coverage in the United States. Moreover, since Congress 
allowed the states several years to fully convert and expand their programs to meet the requirements of 
the new federal minimum standards, researchers can use the rollout of the state-level response to these 
mandates as a treatment in a quasi-experimental research design. 
 Similar to the needs standards established by the individual states in the administration of their 
AFDC programs, there were initially large differences in the income thresholds used by the states to 
determine eligibility for public supports. Table 1 illustrates the average income thresholds facing 
pregnant women and infants, as a percent of the Federal Poverty Level, from 1986 to 1997.7  
Table 1 
Average Income Thresholds for Pregnant Women - Percent of FPL 
State 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Alabama 16 15 57 100 125 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 
Alaska 78 77 77 100 125 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 
Arizona 39 38 100 100 127 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 
Arkansas 36 65 98 100 125 159 150 133 133 133 133 133 
California 112 110 105 146 185 185 185 185 185 199 200 200 
Colorado 46 45 44 59 119 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 
Connecticut 82 81 94 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 
Delaware 39 40 100 100 100 145 166 185 185 185 185 185 
Dist. of Columbia 64 91 100 100 142 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 
                                                                        
6 The annual expansions are as follows: the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1985, the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986, the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987, the Medicare Catastrophic 
Act of 1988, and the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1989. 
7 In the earlier years, these thresholds were often set in dollars rather than percent of FPL. We use Hill (1992) as the primary 
source for thresholds in the early period, and follow him in taking the maximum of the AFDC Payment Standard and the 
Medically Needy Income threshold and then dividing by the annual FPL to generate the numbers reported in the table. 
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State 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Florida 47 60 100 125 150 150 173 185 185 185 185 185 
Georgia 46 45 43 100 125 133 133 168 185 185 185 185 
Hawaii 56 55 55 100 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 
Idaho 40 39 38 71 119 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 
Illinois 60 59 78 100 125 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 
Indiana 34 33 43 75 125 142 150 150 150 150 150 150 
Iowa 67 66 63 167 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 
Kansas 61 60 79 125 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
Kentucky 35 51 106 125 157 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 
Louisiana 34 33 32 100 125 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 
Maine 71 70 97 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 
Maryland 55 77 100 143 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 
Massachusetts 96 97 142 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 
Michigan 71 69 121 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 
Minnesota 93 91 136 185 185 185 185 230 275 275 275 275 
Mississippi 16 37 142 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 
Missouri 36 36 100 100 125 133 133 159 185 185 185 185 
Montana 53 52 50 74 125 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 
Nebraska 59 58 78 100 125 133 133 133 133 140 150 150 
Nevada 38 37 40 57 119 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 
New Hampshire 71 70 67 72 118 133 141 160 170 176 185 185 
New Jersey 74 87 100 100 100 151 185 185 185 185 185 185 
New Mexico 34 33 100 100 125 159 185 185 185 185 185 185 
New York 81 80 76 85 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 
North Carolina 46 59 100 100 159 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 
North Dakota 57 56 54 63 118 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 
Ohio 40 39 38 100 125 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 
Oklahoma 55 54 100 100 125 133 146 150 150 150 150 150 
Oregon 72 73 90 92 121 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 
Pennsylvania 56 55 88 100 125 133 133 185 185 185 185 185 
Rhode Island 87 96 121 185 185 185 185 185 185 245 250 250 
South Carolina 26 44 100 143 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 
South Dakota 43 47 73 100 125 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 
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State 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Tennessee 29 64 100 100 150 168 185 185 185 185 185 185 
Texas 35 34 55 110 132 137 185 185 185 185 185 185 
Utah 66 65 62 100 125 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 
Vermont 81 85 143 185 185 185 192 200 200 200 200 200 
Virginia 47 46 72 100 125 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 
Washington 75 82 90 138 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 
West Virginia 38 69 125 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
Wisconsin 91 89 85 82 130 155 155 155 155 168 185 185 
Wyoming 47 46 58 100 125 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 
 
Note: Married women became fully eligible for Medicaid on July 1, 1986.  This date is used as the starting point for the analysis 
because it represents the start of the period where all women can receive Medicaid.  Before this point, average eligibility would 
be calculated as some weighted function of single and married women, where the "poverty threshold" for married women is 
effectively 0%. 
 Thresholds in 1986 ranged from 16 percent of FPL (Alabama), effectively barring nearly 
everyone with income from public health insurance coverage, to 112 percent of FPL (California), already 
above the first federally mandated level of 100 percent of FPL. By 1990, all states met or exceeded 100 
percent FPL, and soon all states exceeded 133 percent FPL (the subsequent mandated level) and many 
moved to 185 percent. This variation across states and over time allows us to investigate possible 
changes in fertility patterns by parity that coincide with these changes in access to maternity care. 
V. Data and Estimation Approach 
 Our analysis requires a rich national dataset with information on births by parity coupled with 
detailed demographic information and supplemented with state-level policy data. We begin with birth 
counts from Vital Statistics for 1987 through 1997, which defines a period during which all women in the 
United States could have qualified for public health insurance with a pregnancy, i.e., regardless of marital 
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status or the number of previous children, based upon family income considerations alone.8 Moreover, 
since the early Vital Statistics data contains limited information on ethnicity, we examine birth counts for 
two racial groups only: African Americans and whites.  
 In addition to race, as illustrated in Table 2, we use race, age, parity, education, and marital status 
to define our demographic cells.  
Table 2 
Demographic Cell Construction 
Race Age Parity 
Groups 
Education Marital 
Status 
Black 
White 
[ 2 groups ] 
20 to 34 
35 to 44 
[ 2 groups ] 
1st Birth 
2nd Birth 
3rd Birth 
4th+ Birth 
[ 4 groups ] 
< High School 
High School Diploma 
Some College 
College Plus 
[ 4 groups ] 
Unmarried 
Married 
[ 2 groups ] 
 
We selected the groups in Table 2 for several reasons, perhaps most importantly to create 
demographic cells with variation in the number of births. Cutting the cells too finely generated a large 
number of cells with zero births, particularly among African Americans. We also selected the two age 
groups to align with more “traditional” and “at-risk” births for the expectant mothers. Furthermore, by 
using broad age categories, we mitigate estimation issues which could stem from using smaller age 
categories when the general age at first conception is likely to be increasing over time. Secondly, the 
parity groups allow us to examine incremental changes up to the third child, while four or more children 
                                                                        
8 We aggregate data to the quarterly level to allow for threshold changes occurring throughout the course of a given year. 
Additionally, note that married women became categorically eligible on July 1, 1986 (though still subject to the income test). 
Allowing 9 months for gestation, this means that the first observation in estimation will be in 1987. 
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are combined to make the regression output more tractable. The education levels and marital statuses9 
align with common demographic standards.10 Finally, to account for gestation after the July 1, 1986 
threshold – after which all potentially pregnant women qualified for public health insurance based upon 
income considerations alone – the first quarter used in estimation is 1987 Q2, while the last used in our 
core modeling is 1997 Q4. This corresponds to 43 year-quarter observations for each demographic cell 
in a particular state.11 
 In addition to the Vital Statistics birth certificate data constituting the primary outcome variable 
in our analysis, we use annual estimates of demographic-cell-specific population counts, derived from the 
1980, 1990, and 2000 Public Use Microsamples (PUMS) collected during the Decennial Censuses.12 
Please refer to the Appendix for more details on the construction of these population counts. To define 
the Medicaid eligibility thresholds as outlined in the last section, we used archived Maternal and Child 
Health (MCH) Updates produced by the National Governors Association, as well as Hill (1992). Finally, 
we merge several economic and policy controls into the dataset, including the AFDC/TANF benefit level, 
the quarterly unemployment rate, and variables related to welfare reform (family cap, time limit, and 
implementation indicators).13  
                                                                        
9 Initially, we do not separate cells by marital status since it’s endogenous with the fertility choice. Because unmarried women 
have lower incomes than married women, all else equal, we provide results separating married and unmarried women as a 
robustness check. As we show below, this distinction is important so all sample size counts reported include a distinction 
between married and unmarried women.  
10 In the Vital Statistics data, reporting of mother’s educational attainment was not mandated until 1992. Thus, for some large 
states – namely California, New York, Texas, and Washington – data are missing in this early period. To recover these 
observations, we use an allocation algorithm as outlined in the online appendix. 
11 Similar to DeLeire et al. (2011), we estimate the models through 1997 to allow a sufficient period for estimation. Given the 
demographic cells outlined in Table 3, this implies a maximum number of 43 * ( 51 * 2 * 2 * 4 * 4 * 2 ) = 43 * 6528 = 280,704 
cells for our analysis. However, we were concerned about including time-series for cells with zero counts in some years. Small 
change for these cells over time could produce very large proportionate changes. As a result, we fix the panel at the most 
disaggregated level to only those cells which have births over the entire duration of our analysis. With this restriction, the 
number of demographic cells declines from 6528 to 5982, yielding a maximum of 257,226 observations. 
12 The source of this data is IPUMS USA (Ruggles et al., 2015).  
13 See DeLeire et al. (2011) for details.  
12 
 After assembling the demographic cell-based data set, we estimate the following model: 
(1) 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏ℎ)𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏𝑀𝑀)𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑠𝑠−3)𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽2(𝑈𝑈𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏𝑀𝑀)𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑠𝑠−3) + 𝛽𝛽3(𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝑈𝑈𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑈𝑈𝑙𝑙)𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑠𝑠−3)+ 𝛽𝛽4ln (𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈)𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑠𝑠−3)𝑝𝑝 + 𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠 + 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 + 𝜗𝜗𝑠𝑠 +  𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠 + 𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  
where the outcome birth is the log number of births in state s in year t in quarter q for a given demographic 
cell, c, which were outlined in Table 2. The key variable of interest is Medicaid, the Medicaid threshold as 
a fraction of FPL, i.e. coded so that 1 represents a threshold of 100% FPL. We again lag this by three 
quarters to align with the time of conception. The control variables include the quarterly unemployment 
rate (at time of conception), an indicator for state-level restrictions on the use of Medicaid funds for 
abortions, and the natural log of the state population for the demographic cell. Welfare is a vector of 
state-level welfare program characteristics, including the AFDC/TANF benefit level (for family size p), a 
family cap provision indicator, a time limit waiver indicator, and an indicator for the post-TANF period. 
The parameters 𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠, 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠,𝜗𝜗𝑠𝑠 ,𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀 𝜑𝜑𝑝𝑝  represent state, year, quarter, and parity fixed-effects, respectively, 
and 𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  is a state-level clustered standard error. Finally, regressions are weighted by the demographic 
cell group weight and are often estimated separately by homogeneous sets of women. 
 Note that the Medicaid variable is coded differently here than in Joyce et al. (1998) and DeLeire 
et al. (2011), in alignment instead with recent work on Medicaid expansions and insurance coverage by 
Zavodny and Bitler (2010) and Hamersma and Kim (2013). Avoiding the imputation of eligibility by 
simply using the income threshold as a covariate has some advantages. First, it reduces the inevitable 
measurement error of eligibility determination. When classical, such error generates attenuation bias that 
can lead to null findings when, in fact, the policy actually impacted behavior. Second, the poverty 
threshold represents the policy lever over which policy makers actually have control; a change in policy 
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is operationalized as a change in the threshold. This allows for easy interpretation of the coefficient on 
Medicaid: it is the estimated percentage change in births expected given a 100-percent-of-FPL change 
in the Medicaid threshold (ex. a 1-FPL-unit change from 100% FPL to 200% FPL). This can easily be 
scaled down to consider smaller changes. 
 Our key innovation in this study is the addition of an interaction term between the parity fixed 
effects and the Medicaid threshold, allowing us to discover whether the threshold affects higher-order 
births differently than first births. After estimating equation 1, we will replace the Medicaid parameter 
with a vector of four parameters indicating the Medicaid threshold’s relationship to first, second, third, 
and fourth (or higher-order) births. To the extent that these coefficients differ from zero, we will be able 
to identify the marginal impact of the Medicaid thresholds on births by parity. 
VI. Descriptive Statistics 
 Having outlined the key variables utilized in this analysis, it is useful to examine the general trends 
in U.S. births relative to state Medicaid thresholds. Figure 1 shows the annual number of births for African 
American and white women combined from 1986 to 1997 – for all birth parities.  
14 
Figure 1 
Trends in U.S. Births and Access to Medicaid 
 
 As displayed, we see a marked increase in the average Medicaid thresholds selected by the 
individual states as more states comply with the federal mandates. For example, by 1989 the average 
threshold in the U.S. approaches 100% of FPL, while it exceeds 170% by the end of the period in 1997. 
Births increase slightly until 1990 and decline thereafter. Thus, at an aggregated level, it does not appear 
that there is much of a correlation between the Medicaid expansions and births in the United States. 
Recall this is exactly what researchers found in previous papers. 
 Figure 2 displays the trends in births by parity for African American and white women, 
respectively.  
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Figure 2 
Trends in U.S. Births and Access to Medicaid, by Race 
Panel A: African Americans 
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Figure 2 (Continued) 
 
Trends in U.S. Births and Access to Medicaid, by Race 
Panel B: Whites 
 
 Relative to the extensive margin (i.e., selection into motherhood or first births), the intensive 
margin for higher order births for African Americans (Panel A) appears to decline less pronouncedly in 
Figure 2. In other words, in an era of general declines in fertility, these higher order births may be buoyed 
by public health insurance expansions. The relationship for white women is less clear, as it appears the 
aggregated trends are simply declining after 1990. However, this exercise illuminates one important 
point driving the purpose of this paper: examination of trends at an aggregated level masks more 
disaggregated-level trends. These heterogeneous impacts – especially by birth parity – are what we seek 
to isolate in this paper. 
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VII. Results 
 We begin our analysis with regression models that distinguish only on a binary measure of parity 
to compare our results generally with the extant literature, which shows very little evidence linking 
Medicaid and fertility. Table 3 provides results by race collapsing the birth outcomes into the number of 
births on the extensive margin (i.e. first births) and on the intensive margin (i.e., second or higher births).  
Table 2 
Impact of Medicaid Eligibility Expansions on Births 
Modeling by Race and Margin | 1987-1997 
Medicaid Threshold X Birth Parity African American White 
Extensive Margin 
Intensive Margin 
-0.0405 
[0.0244] 
0.0809*** 
[0.0127] 
-0.0614*** 
[0.0120] 
0.0713*** 
[0.0061] 
Sample Size 17,071 17,544 
Notes: The outcome variable is modeled using the natural log of births and regressions are weighted by the 
population of women in each racial subgroup. Models include state, year, quarter, state-year, and state-cell fixed 
effects. All models also include controls for state unemployment rates, maximum cash welfare benefits for a family 
of three (AFDC or TANF), the natural logarithm of the state population for each racial subgroup, and indicators for 
family cap provisions, time-limit welfare waivers, the implementation of TANF, and state-level restrictions on the 
use of Medicaid funds for abortions.  Standard errors are clustered at the state-level and are in brackets with 
statistical significance indicated as follows: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 Of course, this set of results does not account for the importance of socioeconomic status or 
marriage so one should not make too much of the point estimates; however, the direction of the 
relationship between fertility and Medicaid eligibility is quite different on the two margins. If correct, this 
might explain the null findings in the earlier literature and certainly points to more substantive models 
that allow for differences by parity. We turn to those models now.  
Table 4 provides our primary estimates for Medicaid eligibility allowing for differences by parity 
and education level, estimating separate Medicaid effects by subgroup. 
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Table 4 
Impact of Medicaid Eligibility Expansions on Births 
Modeling by Race, Educational Attainment, and Parity | 1987-1997 
    
Educational Attainment 
Medicaid Threshold 
X Birth Parity 
African American White 
Less than High School 
1st Birth 0.2042 0.0748   [0.2763] [0.1646] 
2nd Birth 0.3488 0.2332   [0.2862] [0.1682] 
3rd Birth 0.2974 0.1715   [0.2471] [0.1361] 
4th+ Birth 0.4142 0.2125†   [0.2536] [0.1089]   Sample Size 14,577 17,544        
HS Diploma 
1st Birth 0.1066 0.0015   [0.1677] [0.0873] 
2nd Birth 0.1981* 0.1135†   [0.0921] [0.0631] 
3rd Birth 0.1283† 0.1139*   [0.0662] [0.0517] 
4th+ Birth 0.1550*** 0.1459***   [0.0430] [0.0316]   Sample Size 16,168 17,544        
Some College 
1st Birth -0.0158 -0.0420†   [0.0356] [0.0231] 
2nd Birth 0.0394 0.0126   [0.0446] [0.0290] 
3rd Birth -0.0163 0.0166   [0.0473] [0.0268] 
4th+ Birth 0.0005 0.0061   [0.0482] [0.0432]   Sample Size 16,469 17,544 
College Plus 
1st Birth -0.0771 -0.0479   [0.0484] [0.0308] 
2nd Birth 0.0279 -0.0088   [0.0443] [0.0325] 
3rd Birth -0.0206 -0.0239   [0.0335] [0.0334] 
4th+ Birth -0.0302 -0.0900   [0.0469] [0.0615]   Sample Size 15,437 17,544 
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Notes: The outcome variable is modeled using the natural log of births and regressions are weighted by the 
population of women in each racial subgroup. Models include state, year, quarter, state-year, and state-cell 
fixed effects. All models also include controls for state unemployment rates, maximum cash welfare 
benefits for a family of three (AFDC or TANF), the natural logarithm of the state population for each racial 
subgroup, and indicators for family cap provisions, time-limit welfare waivers, the implementation of TANF, 
and state-level restrictions on the use of Medicaid funds for abortions.  Standard errors are clustered at the 
state-level and are in brackets with statistical significance indicated as follows: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, 
*** p<0.001. 
 To help illuminate the magnitude and statistical significance, Figure 3 and Figure 4 display the 
point estimates with the requisite 95% confidence intervals for African American and white women, 
respectively.  
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Figure 3 | Impact of Medicaid Eligibility Expansions on Births | Black Women
Modeling by Race, Educational Attainment, and Parity | 1987 to 1997
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Figure 4 | Impact of Medicaid Eligibility Expansions on Births | White Women
Modeling by Race, Educational Attainment, and Parity | 1987 to 1997
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We estimate fairly large positive coefficients for the Medicaid effect at all parities for women 
with less than a high school education, but none of these point estimates are statistically significant. 
Among women with a high school education, we do not find a statistically significant relationship between 
Medicaid and births on the extensive margin for African American or white women. However, the point 
estimates are fairly large and significant on the intensive margin. A 10-percent-of-FPL increase in the 
threshold is associated with a 1.1 to 2 percent increase in births for both African American and white 
women. We do not observe statistically significant relationships between fertility and Medicaid eligibility 
among women with some college or a college education, consistent with their likely limited eligibility for 
Medicaid. Given this set of results, while we report estimates for all education levels for consistency, we 
concentrate on the results among women with a high school education in our subsequent analyses.  
VIII. Robustness  
Marital Status 
Having established a relationship between Medicaid eligibility and fertility, we next want to 
determine if that relationship is the same for married and unmarried women, keeping in mind that marriage 
may be endogenous with fertility. Given that Medicaid is a program targeting the low-income population, 
if we are truly capturing Medicaid effects, we would expect them to surface principally among unmarried 
women. Table 5 shows similar models where births are disaggregated by marital status for African 
American women, and Table 6 reports the same results for white women.  
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Table 5 
Impact of Medicaid Eligibility Expansions on Births for Black Women 
Modeling by Marital Status, Educational Attainment, and Parity | 1987-1997 
Educational Attainment 
Medicaid Threshold 
X Birth Parity 
Married Unmarried 
Less than High School 
1st Birth 0.0947 0.2211 
 [0.1773] [0.3119] 
2nd Birth 0.3043 0.2755 
 [0.2351] [0.2538] 
3rd Birth 0.2979 0.2176 
 [0.2628] [0.1981] 
4th+ Birth 0.3819 0.3365 
 [0.3037] [0.2050]   Sample Size 12,943 14,190        
HS Diploma 
1st Birth 0.2312 0.1219 
 [0.2866] [0.1529] 
2nd Birth 0.3863 0.1739** 
 [0.2742] [0.0588] 
3rd Birth 0.2853 0.0930* 
 [0.2231] [0.0396] 
4th+ Birth 0.2017 0.1494*** 
 [0.1637] [0.0331]   Sample Size 15,308 15,179        
Some College 
1st Birth -0.0090 -0.0449 
 [0.0317] [0.0599] 
2nd Birth 0.0582 0.0105 
 [0.0397] [0.0684] 
3rd Birth -0.0141 -0.0213 
 [0.0439] [0.0661] 
4th+ Birth -0.0545 0.0740 
 [0.0437] [0.0680]   Sample Size 15,781 15,566        
College Plus 
1st Birth -0.0691 -0.0699 
 [0.0428] [0.0667] 
2nd Birth -0.0003 0.0610 
 [0.0486] [0.0587] 
3rd Birth -0.0457 0.0614 
 [0.0441] [0.0654] 
4th+ Birth -0.0599 0.0039 
 [0.0539] [0.0893] 
 Sample Size 14,792 13,502 
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Notes: The outcome variable is modeled using the natural log of births and regressions are weighted by the 
population of women in each racial subgroup. Models include state, year, quarter, state-year, and state-cell fixed 
effects. All models also include controls for state unemployment rates, maximum cash welfare benefits for a 
family of three (AFDC or TANF), the natural logarithm of the state population for each racial subgroup, and 
indicators for family cap provisions, time-limit welfare waivers, the implementation of TANF, and state-level 
restrictions on the use of Medicaid funds for abortions.  Standard errors are clustered at the state-level and are 
in brackets with statistical significance indicated as follows: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
Table 6 
Impact of Medicaid Eligibility Expansions on Births for White Women 
Modeling by Marital Status, Educational Attainment, and Parity | 1987-1997 
Educational Attainment 
Medicaid Threshold 
X Birth Parity 
Married Unmarried 
Less than High School 
1st Birth 0.1165 0.3401 
 [0.2046] [0.3044] 
2nd Birth 0.2203 0.4796† 
 [0.2117] [0.2771] 
3rd Birth 0.1490 0.3922 
 [0.1795] [0.2566] 
4th+ Birth 0.2121 0.3577† 
 [0.1695] [0.1931] 
 Sample Size 17,544 17,501 
    
HS Diploma 
1st Birth 0.0802 0.0409* 
 [0.1339] [0.0200] 
2nd Birth 0.1401 0.1437*** 
 [0.1098] [0.0208] 
3rd Birth 0.1022 0.0931** 
 [0.0917] [0.0321] 
4th+ Birth 0.1328† 0.0533 
 [0.0676] [0.0426] 
 Sample Size 17,544 17,458 
    
Some College 
1st Birth -0.0225 -0.0785 
 [0.0193] [0.0560] 
2nd Birth 0.0022 0.0186 
 [0.0293] [0.0643] 
3rd Birth -0.0100 0.0303 
 [0.0259] [0.0712] 
4th+ Birth -0.0176 -0.0263 
 [0.0411] [0.1089] 
 
Sample Size 17,544 17,458 
    
Educational Attainment 
Medicaid Threshold 
X Birth Parity 
Married Unmarried 
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College Plus 
1st Birth -0.0481 -0.0198 
 [0.0340] [0.0613] 
2nd Birth -0.0263 0.1687** 
 [0.0333] [0.0580] 
3rd Birth -0.0414 0.2523*** 
 [0.0339] [0.0656] 
4th+ Birth -0.0944 -0.0478 
 [0.0616] [0.2174] 
 Sample Size 17,544 17,372 
Notes: The outcome variable is modeled using the natural log of births and regressions are weighted by the 
population of women in each racial subgroup.  Models include state, year, quarter, state-year, and state-cell 
fixed effects. All models also include controls for state unemployment rates, maximum cash welfare benefits 
for a family of three (AFDC or TANF), the natural logarithm of the state population for each racial subgroup, 
and indicators for family cap provisions, time-limit welfare waivers, the implementation of TANF, and state-
level restrictions on the use of Medicaid funds for abortions.  Standard errors are clustered at the state-level 
and are in brackets with statistical significance indicated as follows: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 Among black women with a high school education, we find statistically insignificant estimates 
along the extensive margin regardless of marital status. Consistent with expectations, however, 
unmarried women have positive coefficients along the intensive margin. For second births, a 10-percent-
of-FPL increase in the income threshold is associated with a statistically-significant 1.7 percent increase 
in the number of births, and for third and fourth (or higher) births the estimate is smaller but still 
statistically significant.  Estimated effects for married women, in contrast, are uninformative; they are not 
statistically different from zero, but are larger than the estimates for the unmarried, so we simply cannot 
draw strong conclusions for married black women with a high school education. 
 For white women, we see a similar pattern for unmarried women and for women with a high 
school level of education. In fact, for the first time, we observe a positive estimate on the extensive 
margin. The results indicate that a 10 percentage point increase in the income-eligibility threshold is 
associated with a 0.4 percent increase in first births, a 1.4 percent increase in second births, a 0.9 percent 
increase in third births, and a 0.5 percent increase in fourth or higher births. With the exception of the 
highest parity category, all of the estimates are statistically significant.  The married women in this 
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education group again have less precise estimates, though most are fairly similar to the unmarried and one 
is marginally significant. Interestingly, we also observe a positive and statistically significant relationship 
for unwed white women with a college education. We find that a 10 percentage point increase in the 
income eligibility threshold is associated with a 1.7 percent increase in second births and a 2.5 percent 
increase for third births. None of the other estimates is statistically significant. In summary, while we do 
see some evidence of pronatalist effects for Medicaid across race and education categories, we interpret 
these results to show that the robust findings occur among unmarried, high school graduates in both racial 
groups. 
Length of Time Series 
 Based on the length of our time series, we have three immediate concerns that we address 
simultaneously. First, several demographic factors were changing at the same time Medicaid coverage 
was expanding, such as an increase in the median age of first marriage for men and women and an increase 
in the mean age of women giving birth (U.S. Bureau of the Census nd; Mathews and Hamilton 2002). 
These demographic factors could potentially explain our findings, i.e., investigating fertility at a point in 
time potentially conflates a number of issues simultaneously. For example, if consecutive cohorts of 
women have different age-specific fertility rates, then we might identify correlations between fertility 
patterns and Medicaid expansions that are specious.  
 Second, a close examination of Table 1 clearly illustrates that nearly all of the variation in the 
income eligibility thresholds occurred prior to 1993. In fact, only 11 states had any variation after 1992, 
and for most of those states, they changed in only one year and often very little. If our result is being driven 
by the 1993 to 1997 period, then our claims of Medicaid driving the fertility responses is less believable.  
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Third, Kearney and Levine (2009) find evidence that state-level Medicaid family planning  waivers that 
began in December of 1993 had a significant positive influence on fertility. The effect of these family 
planning waivers, therefore, may be muting the pronatalist effects of the program making it harder to 
discern the fertility impacts. 
 One way to address all of these potential problems is to reduce our analytic sample to the first 
half of the panel, i.e., to analyze data from 1987-1992 only. Because the time series is so short, there has 
not been enough time for the demographics to have changed appreciably. Further, we are using the 
portion of the panel with the vast majority of the variation in the income thresholds and prior to the family 
planning waivers.  
 In the first column of Table 7, we replicate the models reported in Table 5 for African Americans, 
and in the third column, we replicate the results reported in Table 6 for whites. In the second column of 
each panel, we show the same models using the 1987 to 1992 period of the time series. We hypothesize 
that if the point estimates are essentially the same between 1987 and 1992 as for the full time series, 
while the standard errors may increase, then these three potential issues are not driving our results. We 
concentrate our attention on women with a high school education since it is among this group that we 
have the most robust results. 
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Table 7 
Robustness Checks - Tests for Compositional Changes 
by Race, Marital Status, Educational Attainment, and Parity 
  African American White 
Group 
Medicaid Threshold 
X Birth Parity 
Core Model: 
All Years 
Limited: 
1987 to 1992 
Core Model: 
All Years 
Limited: 
1987 to 1992 
Married, 
Less than 
High 
School 
1st Birth 0.0947 0.1220 0.1165 0.1399 
 [0.1773] [0.1853] [0.2046] [0.1746] 
2nd Birth 0.3043 0.2842 0.2203 0.2154 
 [0.2351] [0.2377] [0.2117] [0.2091] 
3rd Birth 0.2979 0.3006 0.1490 0.1566 
 [0.2628] [0.2590] [0.1795] [0.1730] 
4th+ Birth 0.3819 0.3374 0.2121 0.2049 
 [0.3037] [0.2806] [0.1695] [0.1908] 
 Sample Size 12,943 6,923 17,544 9,384 
      
Married, 
HS 
Diploma 
1st Birth 0.2312 0.2427 0.0802 0.1019 
 [0.2866] [0.2733] [0.1339] [0.1383] 
2nd Birth 0.3863 0.3275 0.1401 0.1172 
 [0.2742] [0.2645] [0.1098] [0.1143] 
3rd Birth 0.2853 0.2592 0.1022 0.0872 
 [0.2231] [0.2174] [0.0917] [0.0931] 
4th+ Birth 0.2017 0.1911 0.1328† 0.1392† 
 [0.1637] [0.1453] [0.0676] [0.0730] 
 
Sample Size 15,308 8,188 17,544 9,384 
  African American White 
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Group 
Medicaid Threshold 
X Birth Parity 
Core Model: 
All Years 
Limited: 
1987 to 1992 
Core Model: 
All Years 
Limited: 
1987 to 1992 
Married, 
Some 
College 
1st Birth -0.0090 -0.0021 -0.0225 -0.0099 
 [0.0317] [0.0329] [0.0193] [0.0229] 
2nd Birth 0.0582 0.0357 0.0022 -0.0258 
 [0.0397] [0.0420] [0.0293] [0.0312] 
3rd Birth -0.0141 -0.0287 -0.0100 -0.0170 
 [0.0439] [0.0464] [0.0259] [0.0282] 
4th+ Birth -0.0545 -0.0164 -0.0176 0.0071 
 [0.0437] [0.0478] [0.0411] [0.0415] 
 Sample Size 15,781 8,441 17,544 9,384 
      
Married, 
College 
Plus 
1st Birth -0.0691 -0.0506 -0.0481 -0.0496 
 [0.0428] [0.0417] [0.0340] [0.0344] 
2nd Birth -0.0003 -0.0208 -0.0263 -0.0399 
 [0.0486] [0.0472] [0.0333] [0.0334] 
3rd Birth -0.0457 -0.0407 -0.0414 -0.0482 
 [0.0441] [0.0477] [0.0339] [0.0359] 
4th+ Birth -0.0599 -0.0335 -0.0944 -0.0490 
 [0.0539] [0.0617] [0.0616] [0.0601] 
 Sample Size 14,792 7,912 17,544 9,384 
      
Unmarried, 
Less than 
High 
School 
1st Birth 0.2211 0.2058 0.3401 0.3250 
 [0.3119] [0.3146] [0.3044] [0.2958] 
2nd Birth 0.2755 0.2400 0.4796† 0.4137 
 [0.2538] [0.2601] [0.2771] [0.2884] 
3rd Birth 0.2176 0.2528 0.3922 0.3676 
 [0.1981] [0.2015] [0.2566] [0.2611] 
4th+ Birth 0.3365 0.3050 0.3577† 0.3454† 
 [0.2050] [0.1904] [0.1931] [0.2054] 
 Sample Size 14,190 7,590 17,501 9,361 
  African American White 
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Group 
Medicaid Threshold 
X Birth Parity 
Core Model: 
All Years 
Limited: 
1987 to 1992 
Core Model: 
All Years 
Limited: 
1987 to 1992 
Unmarried, 
HS 
Diploma 
1st Birth 0.1219 0.0791 0.0409* 0.0165 
 [0.1529] [0.1440] [0.0200] [0.0245] 
2nd Birth 0.1739** 0.0925 0.1437*** 0.0740** 
 [0.0588] [0.0568] [0.0208] [0.0246] 
3rd Birth 0.0930* 0.0952* 0.0931** 0.0788* 
 [0.0396] [0.0441] [0.0321] [0.0366] 
4th+ Birth 0.1494*** 0.1656*** 0.0533 0.1110** 
 [0.0331] [0.0343] [0.0426] [0.0409] 
 Sample Size 15,179 8,119 17,458 9,338 
      
Unmarried, 
Some 
College 
1st Birth -0.0449 -0.0899 -0.0785 -0.0860 
 [0.0599] [0.0687] [0.0560] [0.0548] 
2nd Birth 0.0105 -0.0356 0.0186 -0.0652 
 [0.0684] [0.0671] [0.0643] [0.0757] 
3rd Birth -0.0213 -0.0215 0.0303 -0.0210 
 [0.0661] [0.0674] [0.0712] [0.0786] 
4th+ Birth 0.0740 0.0840 -0.0263 0.0235 
 [0.0680] [0.0559] [0.1089] [0.0963] 
 Sample Size 15,566 8,326 17,458 9,338 
      
Unmarried, 
College 
Plus 
1st Birth -0.0699 -0.1016 -0.0198 -0.0069 
 [0.0667] [0.0709] [0.0613] [0.0642] 
2nd Birth 0.0610 0.0331 0.1687** 0.0890 
 [0.0587] [0.0507] [0.0580] [0.0821] 
3rd Birth 0.0614 0.0453 0.2523*** 0.1867* 
 [0.0654] [0.1053] [0.0656] [0.0748] 
4th+ Birth 0.0039 0.0971 -0.0478 -0.0251 
 [0.0893] [0.0889] [0.2174] [0.2461] 
 Sample Size 13,502 7,222 17,372 9,292 
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 In Table 7, we show that, among African American women, the findings for the full sample are 
similar to those reported using the shorter time series. The only statistically significant results are among 
the unmarried high school graduates. For first births, the point-estimate is positive and insignificant for 
both the full and limited samples. For second births, the point estimate is positive and statistically 
significant for the full sample, while positive, smaller, and statistically insignificant for the limited sample. 
For third births and four (plus) births, the findings are nearly identical.  
 Among white women, again, we see that the results for the full sample and the 1987 to 1992 
period are largely the same, with statistically significant results primarily among the unmarried women 
with a high school diploma. Among high school graduates, we find similar point estimates across the two 
samples, at each level of parity, reinforcing our finding of larger intensive-margin effects. In the only real 
exception, we observe a much larger point estimate for the four (plus) parity for the 1987 to 1992 
period. Collectively, we conclude that neither a demographic change nor family planning waivers are the 
source of our results. 
IX. Discussion and Conclusions 
 Recent expansions of publicly provided health insurance have largely focused on healthcare 
access (see e.g., Antwi, Moriya, and Simon 2015). However, there is an extensive literature that 
investigates the unintended consequences of social policy changes for fertility. This paper asks if 
expansions of the Medicaid program during the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s altered the fertility of U.S. 
Notes: The outcome variable is modeled using the natural log of births and regressions are weighted by the population 
of women in each racial subgroup.  Models include state, year, quarter, state-year, and state-cell fixed effects. All models 
also include controls for state unemployment rates, maximum cash welfare benefits for a family of three (AFDC or 
TANF), the natural logarithm of the state population for each racial subgroup, and indicators for family cap provisions, 
time-limit welfare waivers, the implementation of TANF, and state-level restrictions on the use of Medicaid funds for 
abortions.  Standard errors are clustered at the state-level and are in brackets with statistical significance indicated as 
follows: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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women. It builds on a literature that has shown little evidence of a Medicaid effect using a demographic-
cell based analysis with Medicaid eligibility measured using state income eligibility thresholds. This 
inquiry also distinguishes between fertility on the intensive and extensive margins recognizing that the 
incentives created by Medicaid enrollment are complicated. In other words, we explore whether the 
expansions of public health care affected the distinct decisions to become a mother (i.e., the extensive 
margin) or have additional children (i.e., the intensive margin).  
 Our results show that there is a difference in the Medicaid effect on the intensive compared to 
the extensive margin for unmarried women. Among unmarried, African American and white women with 
a high school education only, we generally see no Medicaid effect on the extensive margin. However, we 
do see positive and statistically significant estimates on the intensive margin. For unmarried African 
American women, we find that a 10-percent-of-FPL increase in the eligibility threshold is associated with 
between a 0.9 percent and 1.7 percent increase in higher order births, whereas similar white women 
experienced an increase of 0.9 to 1.4 percent in response to such an expansion. While we do sometimes 
observe statistically significant results for some other groups (white women with a college education for 
example), the results for these other groups are not robust across a number of specifications and time 
periods. Interestingly, our point estimates for women with less than a high school education are the largest 
of all education groups, which is consistent with our hypothesis, but are never statistically significant. In 
general, our findings suggests that the Medicaid program is pronatalist, but it is not increasing the number 
of new mothers; the program instead appears to be affecting primarily the higher parity births among 
African American and white women with a high school education. 
 One of the weaknesses in the literature on the fertility effects of social policy changes is an 
inability for researchers to distinguish between what demographers call tempo and quantum effects. Past 
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findings show that some social policies will influence fertility, but it is nearly impossible to discern if the 
policy is simply changing when the individual has his/her children (tempo) or if the policy is altering the 
completed number of children (quantum). Our research suffers from the same limitation. It is conceivable 
that these Medicaid expansions are altering the timing of a fourth child among unmarried, white women 
with a high school education, for example. In other words, in the absence of the program, these same 
women may have had a fourth child. Medicaid just made it advantageous to have this child following an 
expansion. However, because this research actually investigates parity, we are in a position to say more 
than most previous work. The program is not changing the likelihood that an individual becomes a parent. 
The cost savings may not be enough to induce would-be parents into having a child. In addition, it is 
interesting that Medicaid expansions are positively influencing fertility at higher parities. If these births 
are altering quantum, then the fertility effects of the program are generating larger families but not 
generating more parents. 
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Pregnancy Medicaid Expansions and Fertility 
Data Appendix 
I.  Mother’s Educational Status in the Natality Data 
 The birth certificate data collected by the National Center for Health Statistics is missing the 
educational level for a significant number of women in the early period. For example, in 1988, 1,093,417 
of 3,897,495 births – or roughly 28% of birth certificates – are missing the education level of the mother. 
Missing data occur because states were not mandated to provide the mother’s education status on the 
birth certificates until 1992. In other words, reporting before this point was voluntary. Thus – and as 
shown in the table below – missing data on mother’s education are highly correlated with living in select 
states (e.g., California, New York, Texas, and Washington). 
State 
Code 
State Name 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
1 Alabama 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 Alaska 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
3 Arizona 1% 1% 1% 4% 2% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
4 Arkansas 3% 3% 3% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
5 California 100% 100% 100% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 
6 Colorado 1% 0% 0% 1% 1% 2% 3% 3% 2% 1% 1% 1% 
7 Connecticut 7% 7% 9% 11% 9% 5% 5% 5% 4% 3% 3% 3% 
8 Delaware 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
9 District of Columbia 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 2% 4% 6% 5% 6% 7% 9% 
10 Florida 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
11 Georgia 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
12 Hawaii 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
13 Idaho 6% 6% 6% 2% 2% 3% 1% 1% 2% 3% 6% 8% 
14 Illinois 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
15 Indiana 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
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State 
Code 
State Name 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
16 Iowa 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 1% 
17 Kansas 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
18 Kentucky 0% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
19 Louisiana 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
20 Maine 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 
21 Maryland 1% 1% 1% 3% 3% 3% 4% 3% 2% 2% 3% 4% 
22 Massachusetts 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
23 Michigan 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
24 Minnesota 10% 7% 6% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 3% 2% 1% 1% 
25 Mississippi 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
26 Missouri 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
27 Montana 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
28 Nebraska 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
29 Nevada 2% 2% 2% 0% 1% 1% 0% 0% 1% 2% 2% 2% 
30 New Hampshire 0% 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 0% 1% 
31 New Jersey 1% 1% 2% 6% 6% 6% 4% 3% 4% 3% 2% 2% 
32 New Mexico 7% 6% 6% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 4% 
33 New York 3% 3% 57% 57% 58% 3% 3% 4% 3% 3% 2% 1% 
34 North Carolina 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
35 North Dakota 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
36 Ohio 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
37 Oklahoma 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 4% 3% 4% 3% 
38 Oregon 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
39 Pennsylvania 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
40 Rhode Island 1% 2% 2% 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 
41 South Carolina 0% 0% 0% 2% 2% 2% 2% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 
42 South Dakota 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
43 Tennessee 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
44 Texas 100% 100% 100% 25% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
45 Utah 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
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State 
Code 
State Name 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
46 Vermont 1% 1% 1% 1% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
47 Virginia 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
48 Washington 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 12% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 
49 West Virginia 0% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50 Wisconsin 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
51 Wyoming 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
 In our analysis, missing information on the mother’s educational attainment is potentially 
problematic because we use education in defining our demographic cells. More specifically, we use 
education to proxy social economic status (SES). To solve this empirical challenge, we estimate the 
expected percentage of women in each educational category (e.g., < HS, HS Diploma, Some College, 
College +) from a period which has consistently reported values. In this paper, we use the NCHS from 
1992 to 1994. We then create an algorithm which randomly assigns all women with missing data to one 
of the four educational categories, which rebalances the data based upon the expected proportions.1 A 
similar approach is used by the Urban Institute in their Transfer Income Model (TRIM). While TRIM seeks 
to account for the underreporting of use in various social welfare assistance programs in the United States 
by revising reported use with administrative level data (see http://trim3.urban.org/T3Welcome.php), 
the example of “missing data” is very similar to the problem we face with the non-reporting of educational 
data for select states in the early period. 
 One of the potential limitation of using the internal NCHS data from a later period (e.g., 1992 to 
1994) to help us estimate missing education in the earlier period is that the number of observations for a 
                                                                        
1 Unfortunately, multiple imputation techniques cannot be used to address the missing data issues in this 
analysis, since we aggregate up to demographic cells before estimating our regression models.  
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specific demographic cells (e.g., unmarried Black women in Maine, aged 20-24 with 4+ children and 
some college) can be prohibitively small. To ensure a sufficient sample size for reliable estimation, we 
estimate the expected values at one of the four Census Regions rather than at the state level. The rest of 
this section provides an overview of how we conducted the rest of this calculation. 
A. Part I: Using the Pooled NCHS Data from 1992 to 1994  
 Step 1: Using the most disaggregated level of the data (e.g., data by race, age, parity, marital 
status, and educational attainment), we estimate the distribution of educational attainment for each 
demographic cell by Census Region. The average of these values across all of these subsamples is: 
 
 
 Step 2: The values derived in Step 1 serve as the expected educational values for a given 
demographic cell. In other words, the summary above displays the proportions we should expect when 
the data are rebalanced. Thus, the next step is to calculate the current distribution, which includes all 
observations with missing values; additionally, it is estimated across the entire range of the data (1986 
to 1997). Essentially, we are seeking to determine if the educational level is above/below the predicted 
value for a given subgroup. When the cell has fewer people than expected, we will add to it. When it has 
more than expect, then we will not allocate any of the birth certificates with missing data to that cell. 
 Step 3 is to create a rescaling variable. We define this variable conceptually as the percent of the 
unassigned sample which needs to be allocated into a category if the combined sample (e.g., identified 
and unidentified) were to approximate the educational levels reported by the NCHS 1992-1994 data. 
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This rescaling variable will be used to calculate the break points for single observation allocation for the 
birth certificate data in the next section. In other words, this rescaled variable represents the educational 
category probabilities (e.g., PR[ Educ_Adjusted ] ) which will be used to allocate unassigned observations 
into select education bins to rebalance the data. 
 An illustrative example provides clarity and will be explained more in the next section: 
 
Please note that Educ1=High school dropouts; Educ2=High School Diploma; Educ3=Some College; and Educ4=College Plus. 
 
B. Part II: Allocating Birth Certificates with Missing Educational Data  
 Once the breakpoints are established for the percent of missing observations which would 
rebalance the sample, we can then apply the thresholds to the disaggregated data.  
 Step 1 is to generate a random number bound between 0 and 1 for all NCHS observations 
without reported mother’s education. This random number is taken from a uniform random distribution 
and fits the structure of the break points estimated in the previous section. 
 Step 2 is to place the NCHS observations with missing data into one of the four educational 
attainment categories; this allocation is based upon the rebalancing break points. Using the above 
example of Census Region 1 for Black women illustrates: any unclassified observation in the 
Year Race Mom
Census 
Region
Age 
Category
Marital 
Status
Birth 
Parity 
Num
Total 
Women 
NCHS
EDUC1 EDUC2 EDUC3 EDUC4 EDUC Missing
EDUC1 
PCT 
NCHS
EDUC2 
PCT 
NCHS
EDUC3 
PCT 
NCHS
EDUC4 
PCT 
NCHS
EDUC M 
PCT 
NCHS
NCHS 
92 94 1
NCHS 
92 94 2
NCHS 
92 94 3
NCHS 
92 94 4
Differen
ce1
Differen
ce2
Differen
ce3
Differen
ce4
EDUC1 
PR END
EDUC2 
PR END
EDUC3 
PR END
EDUC4 
PR END
1986 Black 1 20 to 24 Married 1 4,406 430 2,072 1,386 411 107 10% 47% 31% 9% 2% 10.40% 44.10% 33.20% 12.40% 1% -3% 2% 3% 0.1105 0 0.4383 1
1987 Black 1 20 to 24 Married 1 4,406 385 2,041 1,460 398 122 9% 46% 33% 9% 3% 10.40% 44.10% 33.20% 12.40% 2% -2% 0% 3% 0.3218 0 0.339 1
1988 Black 1 20 to 24 Married 1 4,242 367 1,764 1,135 343 633 9% 42% 27% 8% 15% 10.40% 44.10% 33.20% 12.40% 2% 2% 6% 4% 0.1141 0.2806 0.7139 1
1989 Black 1 20 to 24 Married 1 4,155 379 1,638 1,112 387 639 9% 39% 27% 9% 15% 10.40% 44.10% 33.20% 12.40% 1% 5% 6% 3% 0.0802 0.3823 0.8023 1
1990 Black 1 20 to 24 Married 1 3,600 270 1,456 989 302 583 8% 40% 27% 8% 16% 10.40% 44.10% 33.20% 12.40% 3% 4% 6% 4% 0.1763 0.4 0.7551 1
1991 Black 1 20 to 24 Married 1 3,227 301 1,486 1,022 340 78 9% 46% 32% 11% 2% 10.40% 44.10% 33.20% 12.40% 1% -2% 2% 2% 0.2336 0 0.5866 1
1992 Black 1 20 to 24 Married 1 2,971 303 1,304 923 330 111 10% 44% 31% 11% 4% 10.40% 44.10% 33.20% 12.40% 0% 0% 2% 1% 0.0418 0.0892 0.6662 1
1993 Black 1 20 to 24 Married 1 2,473 262 1,009 813 304 85 11% 41% 33% 12% 3% 10.40% 44.10% 33.20% 12.40% 0% 3% 0% 0% 0 0.8886 0.9833 1
1994 Black 1 20 to 24 Married 1 2,375 217 1,015 773 299 71 9% 43% 33% 13% 3% 10.40% 44.10% 33.20% 12.40% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0.3777 0.7905 1 0
1995 Black 1 20 to 24 Married 1 2,095 222 836 696 263 78 11% 40% 33% 13% 4% 10.40% 44.10% 33.20% 12.40% 0% 4% 0% 0% 0 0.9998 1 0
1996 Black 1 20 to 24 Married 1 1,854 179 718 686 242 29 10% 39% 37% 13% 2% 10.40% 44.10% 33.20% 12.40% 1% 5% -4% -1% 0.1159 1 0 0
1997 Black 1 20 to 24 Married 1 2,281 252 876 839 284 30 11% 38% 37% 12% 1% 10.40% 44.10% 33.20% 12.40% -1% 6% -4% 0% 0 1 0 0
Break Points
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corresponding Census Region/Age Category/Marital Status/Birth Parity Number cell with a random 
number less than 0.1105 will be assigned to Educational Category 1 (e.g., high school dropouts). Since 
the number of high school graduates is already larger than expected (see Difference 2 = -3%, highlighted 
in blue), no further observations will be allocated. Educational Category 3 (e.g., Some College) will be 
assigned to all observations with random numbers between 0.1105 and 0.4383, while all observations 
with a random number above 0.4383 will be assigned to the College Plus Category. 
 Step 3 is to collapse the data into demographic cells by using the allocated mother’s educational 
status data. We then perform a series of sanity checks to ensure that there are no structural breaks in the 
corrected series from 1986 to 1997.  
II.  Sub-Population Estimates 
 While the annual data collected by the Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER) 
Program allows for estimation of subpopulations by race and age groups, these data cannot be used to 
estimate samples below this level (e.g., by parity, marital status, educational level, or all three together). 
If this issue is ignored and left at a more aggregated level, the very differently sized demographic groups 
would receive the same weight in the underlying regression equations. This is problematic because 
mismeasurement will not be random (i.e. classical) – it is always overestimated – leading to biased 
coefficients of an unknown direction.  
 To derive a more accurate measure of the demographic cells central to this analysis we use PUMS 
micro-samples from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Decennial Census. These data are provided by IPUMS 
and housed in the Minnesota Population Center at the University of Minnesota (see 
https://usa.ipums.org/usa/). We start by defining the demographic cells as outlined in Table 3 for the 
three Census micro-samples. We then interpolate the inter-censual years using PROC EXPAND in SAS; 
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we use a spline, which is the default technique. Under this methodology, note that the values for 1990 
serve as the anchor: they equal the population values derived directly from the 1990 5% PUMS sample.  
 As demonstrated below in the example for African American women in Alabama in 1986 Q1, 
this approach provides a much more accurate population counts for smaller cells than more commonly 
used alternatives, such SEER data:  
Mother's 
Education 
Birth Parity Age Category Births 
SEER 
Population 
PUMS 
Estimated 
< HS 1 20 to 24 51 51,422 3,200 
< HS 1 25 to 29 10 46,856 1,787 
< HS 1 30 to 34 3 40,468 1,895 
< HS 1 35 to 39 1 34,260 1,511 
< HS 1 40 to 44 2 25,076 2,150 
< HS 2-3 20 to 24 242 51,422 3,249 
< HS 2-3 25 to 29 98 46,856 3,053 
< HS 2-3 30 to 34 23 40,468 2,579 
< HS 2-3 35 to 39 8 34,260 2,514 
< HS 2-3 40 to 44 0 25,076 3,143 
< HS 4+ 20 to 24 86 51,422 1,454 
< HS 4+ 25 to 29 67 46,856 3,084 
< HS 4+ 30 to 34 94 40,468 4,296 
< HS 4+ 35 to 39 42 34,260 3,836 
< HS 4+ 40 to 44 7 25,076 3,811 
 
 As displayed by the highlighted cells, use of the SEER – and the lack of data to estimate 
populations below race and age groups – would necessitate the assignment of a population of 51,422 for 
20 to 24 year old black women in each of the birth parities 1, 2-3, and 4+. Again, this would be the 
population across all categories and not the demographic cell which is most relevant to this analysis. Thus, 
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estimates derived from the PUMS microsamples leads to estimates which are much closer to the actual 
sub-population values. 
 
